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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRADLEY YOUNG ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44905
Ada County Case No. CR-FE-20166245

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Anderson failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it sentenced him to five years with two years determinate upon his conviction for domestic
violence (third offense in 15 years) and thereafter relinquished jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Anderson Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Culminating an argument about cell phone use, Anderson slapped his wife, E.A., twice in

the face, grabbed her by the throat, pushed her into a refrigerator, and punched her in the stomach
with a closed fist. (PSI, p. 17.) The state charged Anderson with domestic violence in the
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presence of a child, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. (R., pp. 5758.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended the domestic violence in the presence of a
child count to domestic violence (third offense in 15 years) and dismissed the misdemeanors.
(6/22/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 9, L. 1; p. 17, L. 6 – p. 18, L. 25; R., pp. 69-79.)
The district court imposed a sentence of five years with two years determinate and
retained jurisdiction. (8/3/16 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 9-14; R., pp. 84-86.) After receipt of an APSI
recommending relinquishment (PSI, pp. 41- 71), the district court relinquished jurisdiction (R.,
pp. 92-93). Anderson filed a notice of appeal within 42 days of entry of the order relinquishing
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 95-96.)
On appeal Anderson argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion in both
imposing a sentence of five years with two years determinate and relinquishing jurisdiction.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.) He contends the sentence “was not reasonable given the nature of
his offense, his character, and the protection of the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) He
claims the district court did not reach its decision to relinquish jurisdiction “by an exercise of
reason” because of his “obvious commitment to his family and his recovery.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 5-6.) Review shows these arguments to be without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d
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552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Anderson Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391. To establish that
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. The “primary
objective” of sentencing is “the protection of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376
P.3d 744, 748 (2016).
The district court applied the correct legal standards in sentencing. (8/3/16 Tr., p. 26, L.
23 – p. 27, L. 1.) It found Anderson had a “pretty serious history of violence and it is domestic
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violence.” (8/3/16 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 17-18.) This finding is supported by the evidence. (PSI, pp.
19-25.) His misdemeanor convictions related to violence include assault causing bodily injury,
domestic assault with intent to inflict serious injury, assault on a peace officer, and two
convictions for domestic abuse assault—enhanced.

(PSI, pp. 19-23.)

He had another

misdemeanor battery charge pending. (PSI, p. 23.) The facts underlying the domestic assault
with intent to inflict serious injury conviction were that Anderson choked his girlfriend to near
unconsciousness while threatening to kill her. (PSI, p. 24.) The facts underlying the two
domestic assault—enhanced convictions were, respectively, that Anderson repeatedly slammed
his pregnant girlfriend against a fence and choked her and, a few months later, grabbed her by the
throat and head-butted her when she refused to let him hold their child because of his extreme
state of intoxication. (PSI, pp. 16 (providing aliases), 24-25.) The district court also found,
based on the evidence before it, that Anderson was not at that time likely to succeed on
probation. (8/3/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 18-20.) The record shows no abuse of sentencing discretion by
the district court.
Anderson argues the sentence “was not reasonable given the nature of his offense, his
character, and the protection of the public interest,” citing the domestic violence evaluator’s
conclusion, the recommendations of the parties, the statements of his wife, and his own
expressed desire to make changes in his life. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) The district court
noted the domestic violence evaluator’s conclusion of “low /moderate” risk to reoffend, but
found it undercut by testing indicating Anderson rated a “74 percent chance of committing a
violent act against an intimate partner in the next five years.” (8/3/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 19 – p. 26, L.
3; see
- -also
- - PSI, pp. 12-13.) The state’s recommendation of probation was in turn based on a risk
evaluation of less than a moderate risk (8/3/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-21), so the court’s concerns with
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the evaluation’s conclusion undercut the state’s recommendation as well. Finally, the district
court rejected Anderson’s statements, finding that they were selfishly focused and demonstrated a
lack of insight or understanding into his violence against domestic partners. (8/3/16 Tr., p. 26, L.
14 – p. 27, L. 20.)

Review of the record shows the district court rejected the bases for

Anderson’s argument and Anderson has failed to even note, much less refute, that rejection.
Because Anderson’s claim of error is based entirely upon a factual basis rejected by the district
court, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
Anderson has also failed to show an abuse of discretion in the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction. The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v.
Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d
594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an
abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho
193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).
The district court stated it could not find that Anderson was amenable to supervision or
that he would not present a danger to the community. (2/8/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-9.) It found that
his risk of re-offense was high and unacceptable, and on that basis relinquished jurisdiction.
(2/8/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 9-12.) These findings are supported by the record. The APSI summarized
its recommendation as follows:
While at NICI, Mr. Anderson has had several opportunities to correct his behavior
through interventions from group members, unit offenders, and NICI staff.
Whenever anyone, including NICI staff, attempted to have him look at his
negative behavior, he would use diversion tactics to blame other people or divert
attention away from himself. Throughout his programming, he seemed to have a
5

high need to place himself in the victim stance, instead of acknowledging that he
was creating victims himself. This thinking became a barrier for him to make the
changes necessary to create prosocial thinking and behavior possible. Mr.
Anderson continued to hold onto his criminal thinking/behavior that led to his
incarceration, as evidenced by the informal disciplinary sanctions he received
while at NICI. Considering these types of repetitive behaviors/tactics, it appears
that Mr. Anderson has not been able or willing to discover his criminal and
addictive thinking distortions, or have [sic] little concern about it. Due to his lack
of progress in his program and his continued antisocial thoughts/behavior
demonstrated at NICI, it is my opinion, as his case manager, that he remains at a
higher risk for reoffending within the community. It is further recommended that
Mr. Anderson continue anger/regression management classes in order to respond,
not react, to volatile situations. Given the challenges/problems that Mr. Anderson
will face in his community, a review of his institutional performance, program
participation, and central file, it appears Mr. Anderson is not an appropriate
candidate for probation at this time. Therefore, relinquish jurisdiction is being
recommended to the court.
(PSI, p. 53.) Review of the record shows no abuse of discretion in the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction.
On appeal Anderson reiterates his claim that any failure during his rider was not his fault,
but entirely because of the actions of the Department of Correction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)
Anderson’s argument refutes itself.
The record supports the district court’s sentence and decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
Anderson has failed to show any abuse of sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of September, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNMOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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